Community Control over Camera Surveillance: A Response to Bennett Capers’s Crime, Surveillance, and Communities by Slobogin, Christopher
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 40
Number 3 Cooper-Walsh Colloquium, Legitimacy and
Order: Analyzing Police-Citizen Interactions in the
Urban Landscape
Article 7
March 2016
Community Control over Camera Surveillance: A
Response to Bennett Capers’s Crime, Surveillance,
and Communities
Christopher Slobogin
Vanderbilt University Law School
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Fourth Amendment
Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons, and the
Supreme Court of the United States Commons
This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For
more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Christopher Slobogin, Community Control over Camera Surveillance: A Response to Bennett Capers’s Crime, Surveillance, and
Communities, 40 Fordham Urb. L.J. 993 (2013).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol40/iss3/7
SLOBOGIN_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 6/26/2013 8:59 PM 
 
993 
COMMUNITY CONTROL OVER CAMERA 
SURVEILLANCE: A RESPONSE TO BENNETT 
CAPERS’S CRIME, SURVEILLANCE, AND 
COMMUNITIES 
Christopher Slobogin* 
Introduction ............................................................................................. 993 
  I.  Is Camera Surveillance a Search? ................................................... 994 
  II.  When Should Camera Surveillance Be Authorized? .................. 995 
  III.  Should Technology’s Capacity to Deter Police Abuse 
Factor into Reasonableness Analysis? ....................................... 997 
Conclusion ................................................................................................ 998 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In his provocative article, Crime, Surveillance and Communities, 
Professor I. Bennett Capers argues, contrary to Supreme Court 
precedent, that camera surveillance of public spaces is a Fourth 
Amendment search.1  But he also argues that such surveillance should 
be permitted even in the absence of probable cause, so long as it is 
“reasonable.”2  His third contention is that reasonableness analysis in 
this context ought to take into account not only the extent to which 
cameras can prevent crime, but also the extent to which the 
community will benefit from the ability of the cameras to deter police 
brutality and document evidence of racial profiling and other abuses 
of discretion.3  Professor Capers hypothesizes that this ability to 
monitor the police will enhance government legitimacy and thus 
cooperation with the police.4  I have three observations about his 
article, corresponding to the three main threads of his argument. 
 
* Milton Underwood Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School 
 1. I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Surveillance, and Communities, 40 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 959 (2013).  
 2. Id. at 975.  
 3. Id. at 978, 986.  
 4. Id. at 978, 987–88.  
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I.  IS CAMERA SURVEILLANCE A SEARCH? 
First, Professor Capers argues that people should be able to expect 
privacy even in public, based on what he calls a “nonconventional 
reading” of the Fourth Amendment.5  He points out that many of the 
Court’s cases, from Katz v. United States6 onward, suggest that 
surreptitious eavesdropping of conversations—even those that occur 
in public—is a Fourth Amendment search when none of the parties to 
the conversation consents to the eavesdropping and no one else is in a 
position to hear it with the naked ear.7  Based on that case law, he 
contends, “citizens are not required to assume the risk that they will 
be monitored by a watching device when no duplicitous eye is 
actually present.”8 
There are two possible problems with this analysis.  First, of course, 
in most situations involving camera surveillance, members of the 
public will be able to view with the naked eye what the camera sees.  
Even on streets that tend to be largely abandoned, a few people are 
usually about, which presumably would mean that human eyes, 
duplicitous or not, are often present.  Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court has been quite willing to assume that members of the public 
could have seen what police technology observes even when that 
conclusion requires a heavy dose of imagination.  For instance, in its 
“flyover” cases, the Court has held that no search occurs even when 
the police use airplanes and powerful cameras to spy on curtilage, 
much less the public streets, on the theory that any member of the 
public could have done the same thing.9  And the Court has been 
willing to reach this conclusion even when, in fact, members of the 
general public are not likely to be flying as low as the police did in 
these cases, not likely to possess magnification devices of the type the 
police possessed, and not likely to be as interested in the particular 
property the police targeted. 
 
 5. Id. at 969.  
 6. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 7. See Capers, supra note 1, at 970–73 (discussing United States v. White, 401 
U.S. 745 (1971) and Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969)). 
 8. Id. at 974. 
 9. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1989) (no search when police 
spy on a backyard from a helicopter hovering 400 yards above ground); Dow Chem. 
Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239, 243 n.4 (1986) (no search occurs when 
government spies on business curtilage from an airplane in navigable airspace, using 
a $22,000 mapping camera); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209, 215 (1986) (no 
search when police use a plane to spy on a backyard surrounded by a ten-foot high 
fence).   
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Second, even if this initial hurdle to applying the “uninvited ear” 
cases to camera surveillance can be overcome (perhaps on the ground 
that no one could possibly have seen whatever the camera captures), 
the analogy fails because a properly operated camera system would 
put pedestrians on notice that it is there.  Notice is not only a sensible 
aspect of a surveillance regime designed to deter, but is also 
constitutionally required under the Supreme Court’s cases.10  If such 
notice exists, neither surreptitious nor duplicitous ‘Peeping Tom-ism’ 
can occur.11 
If camera surveillance is a search, it is because, as I have previously 
argued, a right to anonymity in public exists even when the 
government gives notice of its intent to watch.12  That right is based 
on a due process right to locomotion,13 a First Amendment right to 
association and expression,14 and, most importantly, a Fourth 
Amendment right to feel secure from unjustified government 
observation of daily activities15—the latter an interest that has been 
rejuvenated by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States 
v. Jones.16  Camera surveillance is a form of government stalking that 
should not take place simply because the government has the 
resources to engage in it.   
II.  WHEN SHOULD CAMERA SURVEILLANCE BE AUTHORIZED? 
Although we get there by different paths, Professor Capers and I 
agree that camera surveillance is a search.  I also agree with Professor 
Capers that the Fourth Amendment does not require a warrant or 
probable cause for such surveillance.17  Professor Capers is not 
entirely clear as to why he would relax these traditional protections, 
 
 10. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT 
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 126–27 (2007) (citing Supreme Court 
cases that emphasize how notice helps justify government searches).   
 11. As I noted in PRIVACY AT RISK, notice does not equate with real consent, but 
it does alert people to the fact that “they are being watched so that they can act 
accordingly.” Id. at 127.  
 12. See id. at 90–92 (describing a right to public anonymity). 
 13. See id. at 101–04. 
 14. See id. at 98–101. 
 15. See id. at 106–08. 
 16. In United States v. Jones, five Justices of the Court indicated that prolonged 
technological tracking of a car on public thoroughfares should be considered a 
Fourth Amendment search. See 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J. concurring). 
 17. Capers, supra note 1, at 975 (arguing that “[s]everal factors suggest that 
reasonableness will suffice” in connection with analyzing camera surveillance).  
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although he seems to fasten on the idea that the Supreme Court’s 
special needs jurisprudence might apply.18  The problem with that 
approach is that, to date, the Court claims to resort to special needs 
analysis only when something other than ordinary criminal law 
enforcement is involved,19 which is a difficult argument to make when 
camera surveillance is involved.  The primary goal of camera 
surveillance, after all, is to deter and detect criminals. 
My rationale for relaxing Fourth Amendment strictures on camera 
surveillance varies, depending on whether the issue is when cameras 
may be used to target someone or instead when a camera system may 
be set up in the first instance.  On the first issue, my rationale for 
relaxing Fourth Amendment strictures is based on proportionality 
reasoning.  Although even short-term surveillance can chill 
locomotion, speech, and association and undermine security, it is not 
as invasive as many other types of physical or virtual searches.20  Thus, 
targeted camera surveillance that is not prolonged should be 
permitted on less than probable cause.  Specifically, I recently 
proposed that probable cause should be required only if targeted 
public surveillance lasts longer than two days (in the aggregate), while 
reasonable suspicion would justify surveillance lasting between 20 
minutes and two days, and shorter surveillance would be permitted to 
achieve any legitimate law enforcement objective.21 
Of course, targeted surveillance can only take place if a camera 
system exists, which raises the second issue flagged above—under 
what circumstances may government establish a camera system? I 
agree with Professor Capers that the decision to set up such a system 
must take community views into account.22  However, relying on 
political process theory, I have argued that those views need to be 
 
 18. Id. at 975 (“[S]uch surveillance responds to special needs beyond law 
enforcement . . . .”). 
 19. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (holding that a 
roadblock set up to detect narcotics trafficking was aimed at meeting the needs of 
ordinary law enforcement and thus required individualized suspicion).  Although 
Professor Capers states that cameras are also set up to protect the public and thus can 
be justified on special needs grounds, that reasoning could have applied just as easily 
to the roadblock that was found unconstitutional in Edmond. See Capers, supra note 
1, at 975.   
 20. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 10, at 111–12 (reporting research on lay views 
about intrusiveness of cameras). 
 21. Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a 
Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. 
CONST. L. & PUBLIC POL’Y 24 (2012).   
 22. Capers, supra note 1, at 977 (advocating “listening to communities”). 
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discovered and implemented in a particular way.23  Specifically, group 
surveillance systems of the type at issue here must be approved 
legislatively, by a truly representative body, and must ensure that the 
surveillance is not targeted at any one person, group, or locale unless 
the suspicion required for such targeting exists.24  Under this scheme, 
if a neighborhood council approves a camera system for that 
neighborhood after meaningful consultation with the affected 
populace, a camera system would be permitted.  If, in contrast, a city-
wide or state legislative body authorizes localized camera systems 
without the democratic consent of those affected, law enforcement 
should have to provide data showing that the monitored areas in fact 
experience high levels of crime.25 
III.  SHOULD TECHNOLOGY’S CAPACITY TO DETER POLICE 
ABUSE FACTOR INTO REASONABLENESS ANALYSIS? 
Professor Capers argues that, in deciding whether surveillance is 
permissible and for how long, courts and communities should look 
not only at whether the surveillance might reduce crime but also 
whether it can enhance the government’s legitimacy by monitoring 
police behavior.26  I agree that technologically monitoring police 
behavior is a good idea as a deterrent and as a legitimacy-enhancing 
device.  But I am not sure that we need camera systems—that is, 
cameras on telephone poles and buildings panning city thoroughfares 
twenty-four hours a day—to do it.  If the goal is to make sure that we 
know what the police are up to, the best technological fix is to equip 
them with head- or badge-cams, devices already used in some 
jurisdictions.27  That maneuver would avoid overbroad surveillance 
that captures the activities of everyone on the street; instead it would 
focus on those people that the police single out. 
 
 23. Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
107, 143 (2010) (summarizing political process theory’s application to the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 24. Id. at 132–36 (providing examples of how political process theory would 
work); see also, Slobogin, supra note 21, at 31–32 (same).  
 25. Slobogin, supra note 23, at 138–41 (providing examples of data-driven group 
surveillance). See also Slobogin, supra note 21, at 32 (providing additional examples).   
 26. Capers, supra note 1, at 978 (“Public surveillance can also function to monitor 
the police, reduce racial profiling, curb police brutality, and ultimately increase 
perceptions of legitimacy.”).  
 27. See David Harris, Picture This: Body-Worn Video Devices (Head Cams) as 
Tools for Ensuring Fourth Amendment Compliance by the Police, 43 TEX. TECH. L. 
REV. 357, 359–60 (2010) (touting head cams as a method of monitoring police 
conduct).  
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The body-camera fix would also avoid forcing a Hobson’s choice 
on the community.  A citizenry that is bothered by police misconduct 
may well agree to undergo surveillance simply to make sure police 
abuse is deterred.  What the community might really want, however, 
is both less abusive policing and less surveillance of its everyday, 
innocent activities.  Body cameras can accommodate both objectives.  
At the least, a court should not be able to override a community’s 
veto of a camera system on the ground that the system is needed to 
monitor police conduct.  
CONCLUSION 
Professor Capers’s article helps stimulate thinking about the way in 
which community views and individual rights interact.  In my view, 
where police propose to conduct surveillance of groups, as occurs 
with camera surveillance (including the newly developing drone 
camera systems)28, the affected group should be heavily involved in 
the authorization process.  If the surveillance is authorized, care must 
be taken to ensure that all members of the group are equally affected 
by it unless and until individualized suspicion, proportionate to the 
intrusion, develops.  That formula ensures that the interests of both 
the collective and the individual are protected. 
 
 28. RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42701, DRONES IN 
DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS: FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS AND 
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 2–3 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
natsec/R42701.pdf (reporting that the FAA predicts that over 30,000 drones will be 
flying over domestic airspace within the next twenty years, potentially equipped with 
“high-powered cameras, thermal imaging devices, license-plate readers, and laser 
radar (LADAR)”).  
